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Abstract:	 In	 a	 series	 of	 reflections	 published	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Covid-19	 crisis,	
Giorgio	Agamben	 expresses	 a	 number	 of	 concerns	 related	 to	 the	way	 the	 pandemic	
has	 altered	 the	 very	 fabric	 of	 our	 societies,	 potentially	 changing	 it	 forever.	 While	
maintaining	 a	 certain	 scepticism	 towards	 the	 threat	 represented	 by	 the	 virus	 itself,	
Agamben	 claims	 that	 the	 response	 to	 the	 contagion	 shows	 how	 easy	 it	 is	 for	
authorities	to	limit	individual	freedoms	in	the	name	of	public	health,	and	how	readily	
they	are	willing	to	put	such	limitations	in	place.	At	the	same	time,	the	pandemic	shows	








over	 its	 citizens,	 I	 argue	 that	 we	 should	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 social	































exprimă	 o	 serie	 de	 îngrijorări	 legate	 de	 modul	 în	 care	 pandemia	 a	 modificat	 chiar	
țesătura	societăților	noastre,	putând	să	o	schimbe	pentru	totdeauna.	Deși	păstrează	un	






În	 această	 lucrare	 ofer	 o	 scurtă	 privire	 de	 ansamblu	 a	 problemelor	 discutate	 de	
Agamben,	punând	accentul	pe	două	aspecte	în	special:	pierderea	libertății	individuale	
de	 mișcare	 și	 de	 asociere	 și	 implicațiile	 morale	 și	 politice	 ale	 distanțării	 sociale.	
Abordez	 apoi	 aceste	 probleme	 dintr-un	 unghi	 diferit,	 folosind	 teoria	 relațională,	
pentru	a	propune	un	cadru	alternativ	care	se	bazează	pe	noțiunea	de	vulnerabilitate.	
Deși	 sunt	 de	 acord	 cu	 Agamben	 că	 există	 motive	 de	 îngrijorare	 față	 de	 statul	 care	
profită	 de	 oportunitatea	 de	 a	 exercita	 puterea	 necontrolată	 asupra	 cetățenilor	 săi,	
susțin	că	ar	trebui	să	acordăm	atenție	modurilor	în	care	măsurile	de	distanțare	socială	
pot	 fi	 fundamentate	 de	 solidaritatea	 și	 respectful	 față	 de	 autonomia	 indivizilor	
vulnerabili.	
	











In	 a	 series	 of	 reflections	 published	 in	 the	wake	 of	 the	 Covid-19	
crisis,	Giorgio	Agamben	has	expressed	a	number	of	concerns	related	to	
the	 way	 the	 pandemic	 has	 altered	 the	 very	 fabric	 of	 our	 societies,	
potentially	changing	it	forever.	While	maintaining	a	certain	scepticism	
towards	 the	 threat	 represented	 by	 the	 virus	 itself,	 Agamben	 claims	
that	the	response	to	the	contagion	shows	how	easy	it	is	for	authorities	
to	 limit	 individual	 freedoms	 in	 the	 name	 of	 public	 health,	 and	 how	




In	 what	 follows,	 I	 will	 offer	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 Agamben’s	
worries,	 focussing	 on	 two	 issues	 in	 particular:	 the	 loss	 of	 individual	
freedom	 of	 movement	 and	 association,	 and	 the	 moral	 and	 political	
implications	 of	 social	 distancing.	 I	 will	 then	 approach	 these	 issues	
from	a	different	angle,	making	use	of	relational	 theory	 to	propose	an	
alternative	 framework	 which	 relies	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 vulnerability.	
While	agreeing	with	Agamben	that	there	is	reason	to	worry	about	the	







Covid-19	 pandemic,	 as	 he	 expresses	 them	 in	 a	 series	 of	 short	 pieces	
written	 for	his	 column	on	 the	website	of	 the	publisher	Quodlibet.2	 It	






exclusively	 –	 towards	 fellow	 Italian	 citizens	 and	 the	 Italian	 state.	
However,	 the	 critique	 could	 be	 extended	 to	 other	 states	 and	
individuals	 in	 similar	 circumstances.	 Given	 the	 global	 reach	 of	 the	
pandemic,	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 discussion	 I	 will	 talk	 about	 states,	
governments,	citizens	etc.	without	referring	to	any	particular	country	
(unless	otherwise	specified).	
As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 Agamben	 remains	 skeptical	 of	 the	 actual	
extent	 of	 the	 threat	 represented	 by	 the	 virus.	 He	 sees	 it	 as	 an	
opportunity	 for	 governments	 to	 spread	 panic	 among	 the	 population	
and	 persuade	 individuals	 to	 accept	 special	 measures	 for	 its	
containment.	 It	 is	 not	 clear	 why	 Agamben	 should	 think	 that	 the	
pandemic	 is	 just	 an	 “invention”3	 or	 a	 “risk	 that	 cannot	 be	 possibly	
specified”.4	In	any	case,	he	claims	that	it	constitutes	an	opportunity	for	
governments	 to	 tighten	 their	 coercive	 control	 over	 citizens,	 creating	
the	conditions	for	a	“state	of	exception”	that	could	persist	indefinitely.5	
This	 state	 of	 exception	 entails	 restrictions	 on	 individual	 freedoms,	
such	 as	 freedom	 of	 movement	 and	 association	 (a	 fundamental	 pre-
requisite	 for	 political	 freedom,	 in	 Agamben’s	 view),	 but	 also	 a	
degeneration	 of	 the	 relationships	 between	 individuals,	who	 are	 now	
afraid	of	any	contact	with	their	neighbours.	In	fact,	the	degeneration	of	
all	 human	 relationships	 –	 a	 direct	 consequence	 of	 the	 limitations	 on	
individual	 freedom	 imposed	by	 the	 state	–	 is	 even	more	problematic	
than	 the	 restrictions	 on	 freedom	 themselves.	 Agamben	 laments	 that	
individuals	now	see	others	only	as	potential	untori	 –	an	 Italian	word	
that	 roughly	 translates	 as	 “anointers”	 or	 “plague-spreaders”.6	 The	
term	was	used	in	times	of	epidemics,	such	as	the	ones	that	struck	the	
Italian	 peninsula	 in	 the	 16th	 and	 17th	 century,	 to	 refer	 to	 individuals	
who	were	accused	of	spreading	the	“plague”	by	using	poisonous	oint-
ments.	 Social	 distancing	measures,	 in	 Agamben’s	 view,	 transform	 all	
individuals	into	potential	untori,	making	them	a	threat	to	other	people.	
Those	 who	 have	 unknowingly	 contracted	 the	 virus	 and	 show	 no	
symptoms	are	seen	as	a	particularly	dangerous	source	of	contagion.		








ling	political	 discussion	 and	 activity.	 Individuals	 no	 longer	 believe	 in	
anything	apart	from	“bare	life”,	and	are	ready	to	sacrifice	everything	–	
their	 freedoms	 and	 relationships	 –	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 survival.7	 The	
“plague”	which	is	spreading	is	first	and	foremost	a	moral	and	political	
disease,	 rather	 than	 a	 disease	 of	 the	 body.	Worried	 about	 their	 own	
survival,	 individuals	 become	 a	 passive	 and	 rarefied	 mass,	 ready	 to	
subject	itself	to	the	tyrannical	power	of	a	Leviathan.		
Agamben	paints	a	rather	gloomy	picture	of	the	human	condition	
during	 and	 after	 the	 pandemic.	 While	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 reject	 the	
belief	that	the	virus	itself	does	not	represent	a	serious	threat	to	public	
health,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 Agamben	 raises	 some	 important	 criti-
cisms	against	a	particular	way	of	responding	to	the	health	crisis	–	one	
that	 puts	 the	 blame	 for	 the	 contagion	 on	 the	 individuals,	 fostering	 a	
sense	of	distrust	and	division	between	them,	at	 the	same	time	that	 it	
reduces	 their	 freedoms	 and	 allows	 for	 the	 exceptional	 exercise	 of	
unchecked	power	on	 the	part	of	 the	state.	However,	Agamben	seems	
to	miss	 an	 important	 implication	of	 living	 in	 a	 society	 in	which	 indi-
viduals	can	“anoint”	others,	infecting	them	with	a	terrible	disease:	this	
is	the	acknowledgement	that	each	of	us	–	ourselves	as	well	as	others	–	
can	 potentially	 spread	 the	 infection.	 In	 other	 words,	 each	 of	 us	 is	 a	




to	 reflect	 on	 what	 kind	 of	 response	 is	 required	 to	 safeguard	 public	
health,	consistent	with	respecting	individuals’	interests	and	autonomy.		
In	what	follows,	I	suggest	that	instead	of	conceiving	of	individuals	
as	 separate	 and	 separable	 beings,	 and	 of	 collectivities	 as	 mere	
aggregates	 of	 such	 individuals,	 we	 should	 appreciate	 that	 our	 social	
conditions	 and	 the	 relationships	 we	 have	 with	 others	 are	 at	 least	
partly	constitutive	of	who	we	are,	as	argued	by	defenders	of	relational	
notions	 of	 personhood	 and	 autonomy.8	 The	 starting	 point	 for	 a	 dis-
cussion	 about	 pandemics	 should	 be	 the	 recognition	 that	 we	 are	 all	
vulnerable,	 and	 that	 some	 are	 more	 vulnerable	 than	 others.	 Seen	










Vulnerability	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 capacity	 to	 suffer	 harm,	
shared	 by	 all	 human	 beings,9	 that	 is,	 an	 ontological	 condition	 of	 our	
common	 humanity.10	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 vulnerability	 is	 relational	 in	




and	 situational	 (or	 relational),	 or	 context-specific.12	 In	 time	 of	 pan-
demics,	 each	 individual	 can	 be	 infected	 and	 infect	 others	 in	 turn.	 As	
mentioned,	 this	means	 that	 everyone	 is	 vulnerable,	 at	 the	 same	 time	
that	everyone	is	a	source	of	other	people’s	vulnerability.	However,	not	
everyone	 is	 equally	 vulnerable:	 the	 young	 and	 healthy	 are	 less	
vulnerable	than	the	old	and	those	with	pre-existing	health	conditions;	
those	with	 good	 access	 to	 healthcare	 are	 less	 vulnerable	 than	 those	
with	 inadequate	 access	 to	 healthcare;	 those	 from	 privileged	 back-
grounds	 are	 less	 vulnerable	 than	 the	 less	 privileged;	 those	 who	 can	
continue	 to	 work	 remotely	 are	 less	 vulnerable	 than	 frontline	 and	
essential	 workers,	 and	 so	 on.	 The	 degree	 of	 one’s	 vulnerability	
depends	 on	 one’s	 situation,	which	 is	 determined	 by	 one’s	 social	 and	
economic	circumstances,	and	the	web	of	relationships	one	is	part	of.	
Agamben’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 re-emerging	 figure	 of	 the	 “plague-
spreader”	seems	to	miss	the	importance	of	the	relational	dimension	of	
vulnerability.	 No	 consideration	 is	 given	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 distancing	
oneself	 from	others	 is	also	a	way	to	protect	them,	as	well	as	a	means	
for	self-protection.	This	willingness	not	to	put	others	at	risk	may	stem	
from	 an	 awareness	 that	 others	 are	 as	 vulnerable	 as,	 if	 not	 more	
vulnerable	than,	one	is.	Sometimes	different	levels	of	vulnerability	are	







example	 of	 this	 –	 especially	 when	 their	 family	 members	 are	 them-
selves	vulnerable.		
This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 concern	 for	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 others	 is	







component,	 shifting	 the	attention	 to	vulnerability	 (understood	 in	 the	
terms	 suggested	 above)	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	 showing	 that	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 conceive	 of	 social	 distancing	 as	 an	 act	 of	 solidarity,	
stemming	from	the	recognition	of	both	our	ontological	and	situational	
vulnerability.	 Solidarity,	 it	 has	 been	 argued,	 is	 itself	 a	 relational	 con-
cept,	 grounded	 in	 our	 “shared	 interest	 in	 survival,	 safety	 and	
security”.13	 Seen	 under	 this	 light,	 Agamben’s	 claim	 that	 individuals’	
acceptance	of	restrictive	measures	shows	that	they	are	ready	to	sacri-
fice	 their	 freedom	 and	 relationships	 for	 the	 sake	 of	mere	 survival	 is	
not	 as	 conclusive	 as	 he	 takes	 it	 to	 be.	 It	may	 be	 precisely	 to	 protect	
meaningful	 relationships	 that	 individuals	 are	 willing	 to	 sacrifice	 a	
degree	 of	 freedom.	 A	 relatively	 healthy	 and	 young	 person	 may,	 for	
instance,	 find	 that	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 abide	 by	 social	 distancing	 and	
other	health	and	safety	norms	to	protect	individuals	at	risk	whom	they	
care	about	and	whose	health	they	want	to	safeguard.	Besides,	there	is	
reason	 to	doubt	 that	 preserving	one’s	 “bare	 life”	 is	 an	 individualistic	
endeavour	 with	 negative	 connotations	 only.	 Survival	 in	 the	 time	 of	
pandemic	 requires	 a	 collective	 effort,	 and	 cannot	 be	 realised	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 other	 people’s	 interests.	 Again,	 this	 shows	why	 focussing	
on	egotistical	reasons	for	respecting	(or	resisting)	health-related	rules	
and	 norms	may	 be	 unhelpful,	 as	 it	would	 force	 us	 to	 adopt	 a	 rather	
narrow	understanding	of	what	survival	entails,	for	us	as	a	community	
as	well	as	separate	individuals.	










virtue	of	social	distancing	measures	 individuals	 lose	their	 freedom	to	
move	 around	 as	 they	 wish;	 in	 other	 words,	 they	 lose	 their	 negative	
freedom,	 or	 freedom	 from	 external	 obstacles.14	 More	 importantly,	
individuals	 lose	 their	 freedom	 to	 associate	 and	 talk	 politics;	 in	 other	
words,	 they	 lose	 their	 republican	 freedom,	 or	 the	 freedom	not	 to	 be	
arbitrarily	 interfered	with,	 in	 this	 case	by	 a	 state	power	 they	 can	no	
longer	keep	 in	check.15	State	 imposition	 is,	however,	only	part	of	 the	
problem:	because	of	their	“irrational”	fear	of	the	virus	individuals	lose	
their	ability	to	be	guided	by	their	higher,	rational	self;	in	other	words,	
they	 lose	 their	 positive	 freedom,	 or	 the	 capacity	 for	 rational	 self-
determination.16	 It	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 Agamben	would	 privilege	 any	 of	
these	understandings	of	freedom.	Regardless,	it	may	be	argued	that,	as	
a	 result	 of	 restrictive	measures	 and	personal	 fears,	 individuals	 expe-
rience	a	loss	of	autonomy	–	intended	as	the	capacity	to	be	part	author	
of	 one’s	 life17	 or,	 more	 modestly,	 as	 the	 capacity	 to	 resist	 rule	 by	









the	 idea,	 discussed	 above,	 that	 human	 beings	 share	 a	 certain	
vulnerability	 to	 others	 –	 and	 that	 some	 are	 in	 fact	 more	 vulnerable	
than	 others.	 Again,	 this	 means	 that	 one’s	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 is	
dependent	on	one’s	social	circumstances	(including	those	determined	
by	public	health	policies)	and	 the	 relationships	one	can	have	 in	 such	
circumstances.		
Conceiving	 of	 autonomy	 as	 relational	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	
bringing	to	light	the	fact	that	one’s	autonomy	can	be	compromised	by	








who,	 albeit	 not	 vulnerable	 themselves,	 work	 or	 live	with	 vulnerable	
individuals.	 The	 autonomy	 of	 the	 vulnerable,	 and	 of	 those	 close	 to	
them,	 can	be	endangered	by	 the	behaviour	of	 individuals	who	 fail	 to	
take	their	vulnerability	seriously.	The	options	open	to	 the	vulnerable	




amongst	 those	 most	 at	 risk	 of	 harm	 in	 times	 of	 crisis.	 It	 narrows	
political	concern	to	include	only	the	healthy,	able-bodied,	and	socially	
privileged.		
While	 public	 health	 should	 be	 about	 the	 population	 as	 a	whole,	
special	attention	needs	to	be	given	to	the	most	vulnerable.	 Instead	of	
lamenting	 the	 loss	 of	 freedom	of	 the	 privileged,	we	 should	 ask	what	
social	 distancing	 measures	 (including	 isolation	 and	 quarantine)	 can	
achieve	 for	 the	 vulnerable:	 these	 include	 those	 who	 need	 care	 and	
those	who	provide	care	(including	vulnerable	immigrant	workers	and	
women).	 Restrictions	 of	 freedom	 and	 autonomy	 are	 prima	 facie	
problematic,	so	there	must	be	a	sound	justification	for	them.	Whether	
a	 specific	 restriction	 is	 justified	 is	 in	 part	 an	 empirical	 issue,	 which	
depends	on	the	general	conditions	of	society	and	the	particulars	of	the	
proposed	policies.	As	a	rule,	there	is	a	burden	of	proof	on	policies	that	
restrict	 individual	 freedom	 and	 autonomy.	 This	 does	 not	 amount	 to	
saying,	 however,	 that	 such	 policies	 are	 never	 justified.	 Sometimes	 a	
trade-off	between	different	goods	may	be	necessary.	
What	 does	 a	 concern	 for	 vulnerability,	 solidarity	 and	 relational	
autonomy	mean	for	state	authorities	and	the	legitimate	use	of	coercive	
powers	 in	 exceptional	 times?	 As	 noticed,	 Agamben	 rightly	 worries	
about	a	permanent	extension	of	 the	state	of	exception	brought	about	
by	 the	 Covid-19	 pandemic.	 Social	 distancing	 measures	 can	 make	









for	 restrictive	 measures,	 provided	 these	 are	 proportionate	 to	 the	
threat,	 limited	 in	 time	 and	 transparent.	 The	 possibility	 of	 discussing	
and	 contesting	 such	 measures	 should	 always	 be	 guaranteed.	 Indivi-
duals	need	to	remain	vigilant,	and	hold	government	agencies	account-
table	 for	 what	 they	 do.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 individuals	 should	 take	
responsibility	 for	 their	 actions,	 and	 accept	 that	 some	 limitations	 to	






ries	 about	 the	moral	 and	 political	 dangers	 of	 resorting	 to	 restrictive	
measures	 in	response	to	 the	Covid-19	pandemic.	 I	argued	that	 issues	
of	 public	 health	 policy	 can	 be	 better	 understood	 through	 the	 lens	 of	
relational	 theory.	 In	 particular,	 I	 claimed	 that	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 a	
meaningful	discussion	about	 the	pandemic	should	be	 the	recognition	
that,	as	human	beings,	we	are	all	vulnerable	–	and	that	some	of	us	are	
more	 vulnerable	 than	 others.	 Complying	 with	 (justified)	 restrictive	
measures	can	be	an	act	of	solidarity	which	protects	our	relationships	
and	 autonomy	 instead	 of	 destroying	 them.	 This	 is	 why	 a	 focus	 on	
vulnerability	 –	 especially	 its	 relational	 aspects	 –	 is	 preferable	 to	 one	
that	privileges	egotistical	interests	in	the	time	of	pandemic.	While	it	is	
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